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Friday, January 24, 2003
Hendak ke Mana?
Indonesia's Notion of Threat�E
and Governance Issues
By
Arnold Pansoy Alderite
Where is Indonesia's future going? After the official declaration of East Timor's Independence, would West New Guinea (Irian Jaya), Aceh (the last powerful Sultanate) and the rest of Indonesia follow? Would Indonesia eventually disintegrate? How would it survive as one nation? What options does Megawati have to sustain Indonesia as one nation?
This papers argues that previous Indonesian leaders had relatively utilized the Notion of threat�Eto sustain the oneness of the country. Furthermore, it is the absence of this external threat, that pushed groups within Indonesia to turn against each other and consider the others�E(either government, religion, ethnicity, or others) to be alternative sources of potential threat. As threat becomes internal in nature, it may propel the country into possible disintegration if no buffer�Eintegrative strategies (rule of law, strong leadership and governance, institutional mechanisms) would serve to support political strategies. Megawati's present governance may either shift back to the old Indonesian paradigm in relying to the Notion of threat�Eor opt for buffer�Emachineries to prevent Indonesia from further disintegration.
External Threat as a Unifying Factor
According to Campbell, the making of the state necessitates the construction of a hostile other.�EEven Robert Tilman, in his writings, emphasizes the concept of enemy Beyond�Eamong the ASEAN member countries. He, however, limits the concept of threat perception�Eas something that threatens the country if they occur and the perceived probabilities that these events might come about.�E I would like to limit the notion of threat as perceived by Indonesia.
John Smail introduced the idea of the autonomy of Southeast Asian history and argued that, notwithstanding the undoubted impact of full Dutch empire, local cultures [of Indonesia] remain resilient.�E My analysis is that it is therefore the collective resistance, same as that of the collective consciousness�E of the society, among the local Indonesians at the time of Dutch colonialism which constructed the basis of bond, leading to the establishment of a superficial national unity of the country. The threat of domination brought about by colonialism created a sense of nationalism for the Indonesia people. McKahin, as cited by Legge, also observed the same phenomenon. He contends that the general picture was of the pre-war emergence of nationalism as a natural product of the high imperialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, shaped by the changing emphases of Dutch policies�E Moreover, Post modernists, such as Benedict Anderson, claim that nationhood has been constructed through symbols, myths and narratives, allowing people to imagine that they shared a deep bond based on a blood-line and/or a common history, interest and destiny.�EThe concept of deep bond for Indonesia is rather vague, especially in understanding whether the country has achieved the solid foundation in establishing its national identity based on common experience. However, it is always the feeling of insecurity which shaped the experience of Indonesians. As one of the political analyst identifies this insecurity�Eas a result of the country's historical experience, when a series of rebellion of independence movement broke out around the country.�E
Various Indonesian leaders, conscious or not to the notion of threat, were relatively successful in sustaining the unity of Indonesia by creating a hostile other.�EAccording to Anwar, nationalism, distrust of major powers, and a strong belief in itself have produced a tendency towards self-reliance, particularly in the political and military field.�E For example, Sukarno successfully instilled in the mind of Indonesia the emergence of Malaysia as the threat and thus utilized the scheme, konfrontasi.�EIt was an intensified efforts to wrest control of Irian Jaya from the Dutch and launched an ill-fated military campaign against Malaysia to protest its establishment.�E Mackie noted that among one of the reasons why Indonesia contested the formation of Malaysia revolves around the issue that [Malaysia's formation as a country was a threat to Indonesia's security and to the peace of the whole South-Asian region,�Easide from their understanding that the country was a neo-colonialist puppet created by the British and imposed upon the people against their will.�E Furthermore, as Mackie considered the external threat as not usually visualized in narrowly military terms, except in the minds of top military leaders like Nasution, who knew well enough that strategic vulnerability of Indonesian's arm forces vis-�Evis British or American military power.�E This just goes to prove that Indonesia perceived Malaysia as a threat on mere presumption nd superficial conditions. Whether it was illusion or not, it still gave rise to the positive effort of consolidating animosity against Malaysia, and to a relative extent created a collective consciousness among Indonesians.
Sukarno also made an outlandish talk on his foreign policy which is decidedly anti-Western in tone.�EHerbert Feith dubbed Sukarno and his followers the solidarity makers�E namely, those who continued to stress the nation's revolutionary spirit to galvanized the masses.�E Indeed, Sukarno, to achieve solidarity�Eand nationalisms�Eamong Indonesians instilled hostile others- attitude�Etowards others.
On the other hand, While Soeharto put and end to the Sukarno's anti-Western advocacy and Konfrontasi, Soeharto New Order�Estill seemed to be imbued by a campaign against a new threat. This time he pushed for a campaign against the Communist�Eideology. The outlook of the New Order leadership�Egave rise to the suspicion on the Communist China, which it accused of instigating the coup attempt.�E Nasution, as cited by Schwarz, considered the slaughtering campaign�Eagainst communist to be based on the attitude of the Military and the Muslim groups�Eto be uncompromising us or them�Eattitude.
The Notion of Threat�Eas Disintegrating Factor
Although Anderson claims for the construction of nationhood�Eto be imagined based on a blood-line and/or a common history, interest and destiny,�EIndonesia's case remains to be vague. This is especially when one looks at a collective national identity�Ethat is consistent with principles which emerged from its history of struggle. My analysis goes back to the assumption that since Indonesians initially relied on the external threat as a superficial cause for their unity, in the absence of these threats they learned to consider the others�E(who have different ethnicity, religion and political undertakings) to have become the alternative hazard. This time the threat emanates from inside causing inter-ethnic and religious conflicts.
This tendency of having tensions among the local groups in Indonesia therefore has never been remote from happening. Preconditions allow Indonesians to turn against each other. Ethnic and religious fault lines, as predetermined by its varied past cultural experience could be a major contributing factor. There are Hinduism and Buddhism of India which have bearings on the their lives and “left a strong imprint on the architecture and sculpture.�EThe Arabic influence has been promoted since the 13th century, through the teachings of Islam. There are also Southeast Asian and Polynesian cultures, as well as by the influx of Chinese and Dutch peoples.
According to Lab, ethnic group harbor a rich variety of prejudices against neighboring groups: Minankabau are said to be mean and clever, Sundanese insincere and superficial, Madurese as looking for a fight, and so on.�E These prejudices are another factor that would trigger a relative degree of cautiousness, suspecting others to be a potential aggressor. This biases among the local people suggest a strong cultural emphasis for us�Eand them�Eattitude which predisposes one group to harness a relative degree of animosity. It is the attitude: if you are not like us, then you are against us- attitude.�E
Religious intolerance also create tensions in the country, just like the on-going conflicts between the Christians and Moslems in Ambon. Even among the advocates of Islam (as the dominant religion of the country), factions (Sufi School of Islam, Reform Islam, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam) and various fundamental Javanese Islam beliefs (abangan, santri, and priyari) abound. As Hefner puts it: there will always be different Muslim rulers, diverse religious associations, and alternative ideas as to how to be Muslim.�E
It could be recalled that the non consideration of Shariah�Eas the fundamental statutes in Indonesia preconditioned the growing animosity of the Moslem community against the government. They have recognized panca sila�Eas a containment of the religion of Islam by the government rather than as an advocacy for religious tolerance. This indifference is prevalent up to the present. If Islam were as firmly entrenched in the Indonesian law, the policy decisions might have been completely different and may have triggered a different interpretation from groups. Although, this is also remote from happening since even the Moslems themselves could not come up with a common interpretations of Koran.
The attitude of belligerent others�Ewas clearly manifested especially in various violent incidents�E(such as the burning and looting of shops mainly owned by the Chinese).�E Again it was the collective sub-consciousness among local Moslems which was manifested when triggered by certain conditions. The economic crisis that Indonesia suffer in 1997 pushed the animosity being honed by the Moslems in the region. Perhaps the animosity which is still reflective of the September 30 GESTAPU, in turn, an incident which exacerbated the doubt among the local Indonesians to the sincerity of the Chinese. Swarcz concludes that Soeharto failed to “eliminate a number of divisive flash points within the Indonesian society. These included relations between the country's many ethnic minorities, and in particular the ethnic distribution of economic wealth; the relation between Islam and the state..�E
East Timor and Beyond
Many critics consider East Timor to be a unique case which was never politically integrated into Indonesia. It was mainly a Portuguese colony for 500 years, then suffered from Indonesian invasion in 1975. After four years when a UN-supervised balloting in 1999 was conducted, it finally gained its independence in May 2002. But fear for domino-effect�Eis on the rise. One particular example is the province of Aceh, whose regionalist leader Tengku Hasan M. Di Tiro, the titular head of the Free Aceh Movement, avowing for his “fealty to Aceh's past an enmity toward the imperialist�EJavanese.�EHe detests the Javanese to be more than the Europeans whom they replaced.�EThey accused Java to have siphoned off to Jakarta.�EAlso some educated, professional, and commercial Acehnese abhor the Indonesian army, which has abused citizens with such impunity for so long.�E
Another potential initiative to secede would be Papua �Eformerly know as Irian Jaya. With its three-fifth Protestant population religion could have been a potential tool for separation. Although some protestant pastors demanded justice but disavowed violence, and remained neutral on independence,�E the consideration of indifferent others�Eas a potential threat. Finally, In Riau and East Kalimantan, as Emerson points out,�Epro-independence moves and views have thus far been relatively mild.�EThere is also a continued violence in Maluku (Moslems against Christians) where central authorities have been criticized to be ineffective in resolving the entire grievance.
The Buffer�Emechanisms
I would like to argue that Sukarno knew that his reliance on the Notion external threat�E(United States, Malaysia) would not be sustainable, and that in the absence of the external threat, sooner he would need a buffer mechanism to support the oneness�Eof Indonesia. With this he utilized two pronged strategy:tolerance�E through Panca sila�Ein June 1, 1945 (which was later on adopted by Soeharto's government in 1985) and military-grip�E(which he lost in his later years, causing his overthrow through a military coup led by Soeharto.) It is the ideology to have pervaded in almost every aspect of the political discourse in Indonesia.�EAccording to Schwarz, itt is a political compromise that implied the government would respect the religious diversity of citizens.�E
With Soeharto, the New Order�Estrategy emerged. As Swarcz, theorized, citing McVey, the New Order seeks to portray itself [as] the defender or Normality�Eand the Rule of law,�Ethe umpire enforcing the ground rules for interaction between Indonesia's social forces.�E Soeharto went to purge the military and civil service of leftist elements.�EHe consolidated his armed forces and gathered around him strong anti-communist officers (Idris, Edhie and Dharsono) and later a group of personal assistants (Murtopo and Humardhani). It was with blind assurance that created the support for Soeharto's authoritarian rule. But later Soeharto's Panca sila became the basis of the critics this time�Eand even it became clear that the elimination of corruption was not a central priority of the government.�E The threat perceived by the constituents suddenly shifted direction against the very government of Soeharto perceived to have advocated the protection, especially when
Soeharto's family and government were already perceived to be corrupt.
There is no doubt why Habibie and Wahid did not take hold office longer because of they failed to emphasize external threat. This led constituents to perceived their governments to be significantly ineffectual. They just relied on some political machineries which even became avenues for their own criticisms.
It could be recalled that Habibie was so much concerned on economic recovery of the country after abruptly taking charge of the country. MacDonald and Lemco considered Habibie's governance to have cause the crumble on power pyramid that had dominated and guided Indonesian economic and political development. This time there was no emphasis on the external threat it was more on the “redefinition of the military, amendment of constitution, implementation of the regional autonomy, the reestablishment of the rule of law, strengthening of institutions, and the establishment of the various freedoms and human rights associated with democratic government.�E
Also for Wahid his policy was not directed into creating an atmosphere of threat. He did not also have a clear direction in his policy, as Emmerson analyzes Gus Dur's sense of himself [is] not as a commander but as a teacher �Eengaging his people in dialogue that will move the country toward tolerance, pluralism and democracy.�EThen he began addressing the army's intrusive and repressive habits while not stopping security forces from cracking down hard on GAM in Aceh. Gusdor's administration then lacks both the notion of threat as a mechanisms as well as political strategies that would unify the country and thus gain him credence as a potential leader.
Options for Megawati
Given the difficulty a leader should have in trying to lead a country like Indonesia what does Megawati have as options? As I have argued, if there is no external threat perceived, there is the natural predisposition for the elements in Indonesia to consider others as alternative threat. In order to prevent this from happening, there should be some buffer mechanisms to cushion the exacerbation of conflicts -- if not to eliminate them. I would consider three: rule of law, strong leadership and governance, and institutional mechanisms. Each strategy however should not be emphasized without understanding its direct linkage to each other. These instruments should be utilized at certain degrees and levels depending on the political circumstances.
There are however certain imperative questions that go along these buffer mechanisms.�EFor example, there have been many contentious assumptions on the kind of law most appropriate for Indonesia. Would it have its baseline on the 1945 Constitution as the fundamental statute of the Land? Would it follow the Shariah Court and finally re-shape Panca sila? How would the non-Moslems react to these things? Should the rule of law lead to an authoritarian rule? What should be the basis for these laws in order to fortify the government and its constituents that are already perceived to be corrupt? Would democratic governance finally lead the way? According to Hara, Indonesia has not passed the transition phase of democracy.�EHe continued that state in post-Soeharto period has weakened and cannot adequately enforce law and order to protect its citizen.�E Post Soeharto government has followed a discredited governance tagged as corrupt, making the
country a “culture of pervasive corruption�E and that there is a need to mitigate the Bali scandals left by previous administrations.
In terms of strong governance, what is the nature of leadership? Should it be beneficial? Should it be democratic in its extent of handling things? Would decentralization initiate the future direction for economic recovery of Indonesia? How would you create a strong government where there is already a growing animosity and low confidence among various local communities in the Country? Erawan puts it: the central government was criticized for being unresponsive to the dynamics of the regional situation,�Ewhere the government implemented its will without full appreciation for the varying pressures.�E
According to Llyod and Smith, what is needed in the situation of Indonesia is the leadership capable of engendering the confidence and patience of a real constituency demanding overnight Reformasi;�Eand capable too, of maintaining national unity for the term of its natural life against xenophobic nationalism and exponents of destabilization.�E I agree to this contention however but how would you create patience and confidence to the condition when your constituents already get tired of these promises? How would you go against xenophobic nationalism and exponents of destabilization? What mechanisms to use is another question.
As to the institutions, what should be prioritized? Would these institutions serve the function of maintaining Indonesia as a whole country, or would they just re-strengthen the notion of further disintegration? This time Megawati is left with complex options. She could either ride on the Notion of threat again just like her father which may have the risk of bringing her governance to the same path as Sukarno's. If she pursued with this strategy, she may seem to bandwagon with the United States campaign against Terrorism. The danger, however is that she might utilize again the military to justify her cause. The attitude of US against terrorism strategy,�Eor rely on the buffer political mechanisms is also in question. This needs some reconsiderations. The general Moslems in Indonesia irk out in the campaign of the United States in Afghanistan. This might be used by her detractors to significantly discredit her credibility on taking the right side. This would also have some implications to her administration who is making a balancing act between its support for campaign against terrorism and pacifying those who abhor US military aggression in Iraq.
Conclusions
Indeed the Notion of threat�Eis very much significant in understanding both the security and governance issues of Indonesia. The utization of this perception among the Indonesia leaders (whether imagined or real) however needs some careful scrutiny and understanding before it could finally be carried over, or even before it has to be carried out or not. Without the concept of external threat as a unifying mechanisms among Indonesians, there should be some buffer�Emechanisms to prevent further exacerbation of conflicts brought about by religious, ethnic and political differences.
The case of East Timor may be treated as a different case, in a sense that it was considered to be not originally part of Indonesia (until its invasion in 1975). However, this might trigger other conglomerates to initiate separation from the country, if they would continually perceive the inadequacy of the government to place some measures to respond to these on-going conflicts. If these would continue then there is a danger of further disintegration that may happen to Indonesia in the future. These are the things, therefore that Megawati has to look into. As I have mentioned, she may have either the option to follow her father's footsteps, which is the utilization of Notion of threat�Eas an integrating mechanism or simply to intensify her governance in accordance with the rule of law, her strong leadership and governance style and institutional mechanisms. Whatever her options the region would always be thinking where would her policy bring Indonesia in the future. *
***
REFERENCES
Anwar, Dewin Fortuna. From the Struggle for West to Confrontation with Malaysia.�EIndonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.
Anwar, Dewin Fortuna. The New Order and the Birth of ASEAN (1966-1967) in Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. Indonesia.�E Ken Booth and Russel Trood (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999.
Cribb, Robert. The Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia.�EAustralian Journal of International Affairs 53, No. 2, 1999, as cited in Booth, Anne, "Can Indonesia Survive as a Unitary State?," Indonesia Circle 58 No. 32.
Emmerson, Donald K. Will Indonesia Survive.�EForeign Affairs 79, No. 3, pp. 95-106.
Erawan, Ketut Putra. Political Reform and Regional Politics In Indonesia,�EAsian Survey 34, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 581-611.
Grayson, Llyod J. and Shannon L. Smith (eds.) Thoughts on Indonesian History.�EIndonesia Today: Challenges of History, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.
Hara, Abubakar E. The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia.�EContemporary Southeast Asia 23, No. 2, August 2001, pp. 307-326.
Hefner, Robert W. Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization.�ESociology of Religion. 62, No. 4, Washington; Winter 2001. (pp. 491-514).
Lab, Kunieda. Republic of Indonesia,�E Available. On-line. (June 14, 2002).
Legge, John. The Continent and the Unforeseen.�EIndonesia Today: Challenges of History, Singapore: Australian National University, 2001
MacDonald, Scott B. and Jonathan Lemco, Indonesia: Living Dangerously,�ECurrent History, April 2001, p. 177. (176-182).
Mackie, J.A. The Course of Confrontation,�EKonfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute (1963-1966). Malaysia: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1974, p. 201.
Ramage, Douglas E. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance. in Michael Leifer, London School of Economics, London, 1995.
Schwarz, Adam. Growing Pains,�EA Nation in Waiting, United States: Westview Press, 2000.
Schwarz, Adam Introduction: The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia.�EAdam Scwarz and Jonathan Paris, The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia, United State of America: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999.
Schwarz, Adam. "Soeharto takes Charge." A Nation in Waiting, United States: Westview Press, 2000, as cited in Ruth Mc Vey, The Case of the Disappearing Decade�E A paper delivered to the Conference on Indonesia Democracy, 1950s and 1990s, Monash University, 17-12 December 1992.
Soetrisno, Leokman. "Current Social and Political Conditions of Rural Indonesia,"�EGeoffery Forester (ed.), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos (Assessment 1998), Singapore, 1999.
Symonds, Peter. "US Administration Pushes for Military Presence in Indonesia."�EWorld Socialist Website, 12 April 2002, 7 pages, On-line. Available.
(June 4, 2002).
Tilman, Robert O. Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987; The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region, Institute of South Asian Studies, 1984.
For comments and suggestions: alderite@iuj.ac.jp
Indonesia's Notion of Threat�E
and Governance Issues
By
Arnold Pansoy Alderite
Where is Indonesia's future going? After the official declaration of East Timor's Independence, would West New Guinea (Irian Jaya), Aceh (the last powerful Sultanate) and the rest of Indonesia follow? Would Indonesia eventually disintegrate? How would it survive as one nation? What options does Megawati have to sustain Indonesia as one nation?
This papers argues that previous Indonesian leaders had relatively utilized the Notion of threat�Eto sustain the oneness of the country. Furthermore, it is the absence of this external threat, that pushed groups within Indonesia to turn against each other and consider the others�E(either government, religion, ethnicity, or others) to be alternative sources of potential threat. As threat becomes internal in nature, it may propel the country into possible disintegration if no buffer�Eintegrative strategies (rule of law, strong leadership and governance, institutional mechanisms) would serve to support political strategies. Megawati's present governance may either shift back to the old Indonesian paradigm in relying to the Notion of threat�Eor opt for buffer�Emachineries to prevent Indonesia from further disintegration.
External Threat as a Unifying Factor
According to Campbell, the making of the state necessitates the construction of a hostile other.�EEven Robert Tilman, in his writings, emphasizes the concept of enemy Beyond�Eamong the ASEAN member countries. He, however, limits the concept of threat perception�Eas something that threatens the country if they occur and the perceived probabilities that these events might come about.�E I would like to limit the notion of threat as perceived by Indonesia.
John Smail introduced the idea of the autonomy of Southeast Asian history and argued that, notwithstanding the undoubted impact of full Dutch empire, local cultures [of Indonesia] remain resilient.�E My analysis is that it is therefore the collective resistance, same as that of the collective consciousness�E of the society, among the local Indonesians at the time of Dutch colonialism which constructed the basis of bond, leading to the establishment of a superficial national unity of the country. The threat of domination brought about by colonialism created a sense of nationalism for the Indonesia people. McKahin, as cited by Legge, also observed the same phenomenon. He contends that the general picture was of the pre-war emergence of nationalism as a natural product of the high imperialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, shaped by the changing emphases of Dutch policies�E Moreover, Post modernists, such as Benedict Anderson, claim that nationhood has been constructed through symbols, myths and narratives, allowing people to imagine that they shared a deep bond based on a blood-line and/or a common history, interest and destiny.�EThe concept of deep bond for Indonesia is rather vague, especially in understanding whether the country has achieved the solid foundation in establishing its national identity based on common experience. However, it is always the feeling of insecurity which shaped the experience of Indonesians. As one of the political analyst identifies this insecurity�Eas a result of the country's historical experience, when a series of rebellion of independence movement broke out around the country.�E
Various Indonesian leaders, conscious or not to the notion of threat, were relatively successful in sustaining the unity of Indonesia by creating a hostile other.�EAccording to Anwar, nationalism, distrust of major powers, and a strong belief in itself have produced a tendency towards self-reliance, particularly in the political and military field.�E For example, Sukarno successfully instilled in the mind of Indonesia the emergence of Malaysia as the threat and thus utilized the scheme, konfrontasi.�EIt was an intensified efforts to wrest control of Irian Jaya from the Dutch and launched an ill-fated military campaign against Malaysia to protest its establishment.�E Mackie noted that among one of the reasons why Indonesia contested the formation of Malaysia revolves around the issue that [Malaysia's formation as a country was a threat to Indonesia's security and to the peace of the whole South-Asian region,�Easide from their understanding that the country was a neo-colonialist puppet created by the British and imposed upon the people against their will.�E Furthermore, as Mackie considered the external threat as not usually visualized in narrowly military terms, except in the minds of top military leaders like Nasution, who knew well enough that strategic vulnerability of Indonesian's arm forces vis-�Evis British or American military power.�E This just goes to prove that Indonesia perceived Malaysia as a threat on mere presumption nd superficial conditions. Whether it was illusion or not, it still gave rise to the positive effort of consolidating animosity against Malaysia, and to a relative extent created a collective consciousness among Indonesians.
Sukarno also made an outlandish talk on his foreign policy which is decidedly anti-Western in tone.�EHerbert Feith dubbed Sukarno and his followers the solidarity makers�E namely, those who continued to stress the nation's revolutionary spirit to galvanized the masses.�E Indeed, Sukarno, to achieve solidarity�Eand nationalisms�Eamong Indonesians instilled hostile others- attitude�Etowards others.
On the other hand, While Soeharto put and end to the Sukarno's anti-Western advocacy and Konfrontasi, Soeharto New Order�Estill seemed to be imbued by a campaign against a new threat. This time he pushed for a campaign against the Communist�Eideology. The outlook of the New Order leadership�Egave rise to the suspicion on the Communist China, which it accused of instigating the coup attempt.�E Nasution, as cited by Schwarz, considered the slaughtering campaign�Eagainst communist to be based on the attitude of the Military and the Muslim groups�Eto be uncompromising us or them�Eattitude.
The Notion of Threat�Eas Disintegrating Factor
Although Anderson claims for the construction of nationhood�Eto be imagined based on a blood-line and/or a common history, interest and destiny,�EIndonesia's case remains to be vague. This is especially when one looks at a collective national identity�Ethat is consistent with principles which emerged from its history of struggle. My analysis goes back to the assumption that since Indonesians initially relied on the external threat as a superficial cause for their unity, in the absence of these threats they learned to consider the others�E(who have different ethnicity, religion and political undertakings) to have become the alternative hazard. This time the threat emanates from inside causing inter-ethnic and religious conflicts.
This tendency of having tensions among the local groups in Indonesia therefore has never been remote from happening. Preconditions allow Indonesians to turn against each other. Ethnic and religious fault lines, as predetermined by its varied past cultural experience could be a major contributing factor. There are Hinduism and Buddhism of India which have bearings on the their lives and “left a strong imprint on the architecture and sculpture.�EThe Arabic influence has been promoted since the 13th century, through the teachings of Islam. There are also Southeast Asian and Polynesian cultures, as well as by the influx of Chinese and Dutch peoples.
According to Lab, ethnic group harbor a rich variety of prejudices against neighboring groups: Minankabau are said to be mean and clever, Sundanese insincere and superficial, Madurese as looking for a fight, and so on.�E These prejudices are another factor that would trigger a relative degree of cautiousness, suspecting others to be a potential aggressor. This biases among the local people suggest a strong cultural emphasis for us�Eand them�Eattitude which predisposes one group to harness a relative degree of animosity. It is the attitude: if you are not like us, then you are against us- attitude.�E
Religious intolerance also create tensions in the country, just like the on-going conflicts between the Christians and Moslems in Ambon. Even among the advocates of Islam (as the dominant religion of the country), factions (Sufi School of Islam, Reform Islam, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam) and various fundamental Javanese Islam beliefs (abangan, santri, and priyari) abound. As Hefner puts it: there will always be different Muslim rulers, diverse religious associations, and alternative ideas as to how to be Muslim.�E
It could be recalled that the non consideration of Shariah�Eas the fundamental statutes in Indonesia preconditioned the growing animosity of the Moslem community against the government. They have recognized panca sila�Eas a containment of the religion of Islam by the government rather than as an advocacy for religious tolerance. This indifference is prevalent up to the present. If Islam were as firmly entrenched in the Indonesian law, the policy decisions might have been completely different and may have triggered a different interpretation from groups. Although, this is also remote from happening since even the Moslems themselves could not come up with a common interpretations of Koran.
The attitude of belligerent others�Ewas clearly manifested especially in various violent incidents�E(such as the burning and looting of shops mainly owned by the Chinese).�E Again it was the collective sub-consciousness among local Moslems which was manifested when triggered by certain conditions. The economic crisis that Indonesia suffer in 1997 pushed the animosity being honed by the Moslems in the region. Perhaps the animosity which is still reflective of the September 30 GESTAPU, in turn, an incident which exacerbated the doubt among the local Indonesians to the sincerity of the Chinese. Swarcz concludes that Soeharto failed to “eliminate a number of divisive flash points within the Indonesian society. These included relations between the country's many ethnic minorities, and in particular the ethnic distribution of economic wealth; the relation between Islam and the state..�E
East Timor and Beyond
Many critics consider East Timor to be a unique case which was never politically integrated into Indonesia. It was mainly a Portuguese colony for 500 years, then suffered from Indonesian invasion in 1975. After four years when a UN-supervised balloting in 1999 was conducted, it finally gained its independence in May 2002. But fear for domino-effect�Eis on the rise. One particular example is the province of Aceh, whose regionalist leader Tengku Hasan M. Di Tiro, the titular head of the Free Aceh Movement, avowing for his “fealty to Aceh's past an enmity toward the imperialist�EJavanese.�EHe detests the Javanese to be more than the Europeans whom they replaced.�EThey accused Java to have siphoned off to Jakarta.�EAlso some educated, professional, and commercial Acehnese abhor the Indonesian army, which has abused citizens with such impunity for so long.�E
Another potential initiative to secede would be Papua �Eformerly know as Irian Jaya. With its three-fifth Protestant population religion could have been a potential tool for separation. Although some protestant pastors demanded justice but disavowed violence, and remained neutral on independence,�E the consideration of indifferent others�Eas a potential threat. Finally, In Riau and East Kalimantan, as Emerson points out,�Epro-independence moves and views have thus far been relatively mild.�EThere is also a continued violence in Maluku (Moslems against Christians) where central authorities have been criticized to be ineffective in resolving the entire grievance.
The Buffer�Emechanisms
I would like to argue that Sukarno knew that his reliance on the Notion external threat�E(United States, Malaysia) would not be sustainable, and that in the absence of the external threat, sooner he would need a buffer mechanism to support the oneness�Eof Indonesia. With this he utilized two pronged strategy:tolerance�E through Panca sila�Ein June 1, 1945 (which was later on adopted by Soeharto's government in 1985) and military-grip�E(which he lost in his later years, causing his overthrow through a military coup led by Soeharto.) It is the ideology to have pervaded in almost every aspect of the political discourse in Indonesia.�EAccording to Schwarz, itt is a political compromise that implied the government would respect the religious diversity of citizens.�E
With Soeharto, the New Order�Estrategy emerged. As Swarcz, theorized, citing McVey, the New Order seeks to portray itself [as] the defender or Normality�Eand the Rule of law,�Ethe umpire enforcing the ground rules for interaction between Indonesia's social forces.�E Soeharto went to purge the military and civil service of leftist elements.�EHe consolidated his armed forces and gathered around him strong anti-communist officers (Idris, Edhie and Dharsono) and later a group of personal assistants (Murtopo and Humardhani). It was with blind assurance that created the support for Soeharto's authoritarian rule. But later Soeharto's Panca sila became the basis of the critics this time�Eand even it became clear that the elimination of corruption was not a central priority of the government.�E The threat perceived by the constituents suddenly shifted direction against the very government of Soeharto perceived to have advocated the protection, especially when
Soeharto's family and government were already perceived to be corrupt.
There is no doubt why Habibie and Wahid did not take hold office longer because of they failed to emphasize external threat. This led constituents to perceived their governments to be significantly ineffectual. They just relied on some political machineries which even became avenues for their own criticisms.
It could be recalled that Habibie was so much concerned on economic recovery of the country after abruptly taking charge of the country. MacDonald and Lemco considered Habibie's governance to have cause the crumble on power pyramid that had dominated and guided Indonesian economic and political development. This time there was no emphasis on the external threat it was more on the “redefinition of the military, amendment of constitution, implementation of the regional autonomy, the reestablishment of the rule of law, strengthening of institutions, and the establishment of the various freedoms and human rights associated with democratic government.�E
Also for Wahid his policy was not directed into creating an atmosphere of threat. He did not also have a clear direction in his policy, as Emmerson analyzes Gus Dur's sense of himself [is] not as a commander but as a teacher �Eengaging his people in dialogue that will move the country toward tolerance, pluralism and democracy.�EThen he began addressing the army's intrusive and repressive habits while not stopping security forces from cracking down hard on GAM in Aceh. Gusdor's administration then lacks both the notion of threat as a mechanisms as well as political strategies that would unify the country and thus gain him credence as a potential leader.
Options for Megawati
Given the difficulty a leader should have in trying to lead a country like Indonesia what does Megawati have as options? As I have argued, if there is no external threat perceived, there is the natural predisposition for the elements in Indonesia to consider others as alternative threat. In order to prevent this from happening, there should be some buffer mechanisms to cushion the exacerbation of conflicts -- if not to eliminate them. I would consider three: rule of law, strong leadership and governance, and institutional mechanisms. Each strategy however should not be emphasized without understanding its direct linkage to each other. These instruments should be utilized at certain degrees and levels depending on the political circumstances.
There are however certain imperative questions that go along these buffer mechanisms.�EFor example, there have been many contentious assumptions on the kind of law most appropriate for Indonesia. Would it have its baseline on the 1945 Constitution as the fundamental statute of the Land? Would it follow the Shariah Court and finally re-shape Panca sila? How would the non-Moslems react to these things? Should the rule of law lead to an authoritarian rule? What should be the basis for these laws in order to fortify the government and its constituents that are already perceived to be corrupt? Would democratic governance finally lead the way? According to Hara, Indonesia has not passed the transition phase of democracy.�EHe continued that state in post-Soeharto period has weakened and cannot adequately enforce law and order to protect its citizen.�E Post Soeharto government has followed a discredited governance tagged as corrupt, making the
country a “culture of pervasive corruption�E and that there is a need to mitigate the Bali scandals left by previous administrations.
In terms of strong governance, what is the nature of leadership? Should it be beneficial? Should it be democratic in its extent of handling things? Would decentralization initiate the future direction for economic recovery of Indonesia? How would you create a strong government where there is already a growing animosity and low confidence among various local communities in the Country? Erawan puts it: the central government was criticized for being unresponsive to the dynamics of the regional situation,�Ewhere the government implemented its will without full appreciation for the varying pressures.�E
According to Llyod and Smith, what is needed in the situation of Indonesia is the leadership capable of engendering the confidence and patience of a real constituency demanding overnight Reformasi;�Eand capable too, of maintaining national unity for the term of its natural life against xenophobic nationalism and exponents of destabilization.�E I agree to this contention however but how would you create patience and confidence to the condition when your constituents already get tired of these promises? How would you go against xenophobic nationalism and exponents of destabilization? What mechanisms to use is another question.
As to the institutions, what should be prioritized? Would these institutions serve the function of maintaining Indonesia as a whole country, or would they just re-strengthen the notion of further disintegration? This time Megawati is left with complex options. She could either ride on the Notion of threat again just like her father which may have the risk of bringing her governance to the same path as Sukarno's. If she pursued with this strategy, she may seem to bandwagon with the United States campaign against Terrorism. The danger, however is that she might utilize again the military to justify her cause. The attitude of US against terrorism strategy,�Eor rely on the buffer political mechanisms is also in question. This needs some reconsiderations. The general Moslems in Indonesia irk out in the campaign of the United States in Afghanistan. This might be used by her detractors to significantly discredit her credibility on taking the right side. This would also have some implications to her administration who is making a balancing act between its support for campaign against terrorism and pacifying those who abhor US military aggression in Iraq.
Conclusions
Indeed the Notion of threat�Eis very much significant in understanding both the security and governance issues of Indonesia. The utization of this perception among the Indonesia leaders (whether imagined or real) however needs some careful scrutiny and understanding before it could finally be carried over, or even before it has to be carried out or not. Without the concept of external threat as a unifying mechanisms among Indonesians, there should be some buffer�Emechanisms to prevent further exacerbation of conflicts brought about by religious, ethnic and political differences.
The case of East Timor may be treated as a different case, in a sense that it was considered to be not originally part of Indonesia (until its invasion in 1975). However, this might trigger other conglomerates to initiate separation from the country, if they would continually perceive the inadequacy of the government to place some measures to respond to these on-going conflicts. If these would continue then there is a danger of further disintegration that may happen to Indonesia in the future. These are the things, therefore that Megawati has to look into. As I have mentioned, she may have either the option to follow her father's footsteps, which is the utilization of Notion of threat�Eas an integrating mechanism or simply to intensify her governance in accordance with the rule of law, her strong leadership and governance style and institutional mechanisms. Whatever her options the region would always be thinking where would her policy bring Indonesia in the future. *
***
REFERENCES
Anwar, Dewin Fortuna. From the Struggle for West to Confrontation with Malaysia.�EIndonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.
Anwar, Dewin Fortuna. The New Order and the Birth of ASEAN (1966-1967) in Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. Indonesia.�E Ken Booth and Russel Trood (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999.
Cribb, Robert. The Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia.�EAustralian Journal of International Affairs 53, No. 2, 1999, as cited in Booth, Anne, "Can Indonesia Survive as a Unitary State?," Indonesia Circle 58 No. 32.
Emmerson, Donald K. Will Indonesia Survive.�EForeign Affairs 79, No. 3, pp. 95-106.
Erawan, Ketut Putra. Political Reform and Regional Politics In Indonesia,�EAsian Survey 34, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 581-611.
Grayson, Llyod J. and Shannon L. Smith (eds.) Thoughts on Indonesian History.�EIndonesia Today: Challenges of History, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.
Hara, Abubakar E. The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia.�EContemporary Southeast Asia 23, No. 2, August 2001, pp. 307-326.
Hefner, Robert W. Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization.�ESociology of Religion. 62, No. 4, Washington; Winter 2001. (pp. 491-514).
Lab, Kunieda. Republic of Indonesia,�E Available. On-line.
Legge, John. The Continent and the Unforeseen.�EIndonesia Today: Challenges of History, Singapore: Australian National University, 2001
MacDonald, Scott B. and Jonathan Lemco, Indonesia: Living Dangerously,�ECurrent History, April 2001, p. 177. (176-182).
Mackie, J.A. The Course of Confrontation,�EKonfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute (1963-1966). Malaysia: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1974, p. 201.
Ramage, Douglas E. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance. in Michael Leifer, London School of Economics, London, 1995.
Schwarz, Adam. Growing Pains,�EA Nation in Waiting, United States: Westview Press, 2000.
Schwarz, Adam Introduction: The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia.�EAdam Scwarz and Jonathan Paris, The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia, United State of America: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999.
Schwarz, Adam. "Soeharto takes Charge." A Nation in Waiting, United States: Westview Press, 2000, as cited in Ruth Mc Vey, The Case of the Disappearing Decade�E A paper delivered to the Conference on Indonesia Democracy, 1950s and 1990s, Monash University, 17-12 December 1992.
Soetrisno, Leokman. "Current Social and Political Conditions of Rural Indonesia,"�EGeoffery Forester (ed.), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos (Assessment 1998), Singapore, 1999.
Symonds, Peter. "US Administration Pushes for Military Presence in Indonesia."�EWorld Socialist Website, 12 April 2002, 7 pages, On-line. Available.
(June 4, 2002).
Tilman, Robert O. Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987; The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region, Institute of South Asian Studies, 1984.
For comments and suggestions: alderite@iuj.ac.jp
posted by Unknown at
7:42 AM
Saving Our Great Planet Earth:
Towards A Borderless Stewardship of Environment
by
Arnold Pansoy Alderite
Over the course of the 20th century, we had recognized our interdependent relationship with the great planet Earth. Initially, both man and technology did not possess the capability to significantly influence the planetary systems. But as the 21st century dawned, we started to alarmingly affect the earth's atmosphere, the courses of water, the landscapes, and the relationships among organisms in a natural habitat.
Furthermore, we witnessed the incredible developments in technology, the five-fold growth in the world economy, and the increasing human population of six billion. All these influenced us to become eco-optimists. We saw the abundance of our natural resources. Yet, we relied on human ingenuity so much that we considered its depletion to be of no problem. In fact, governments of nations put our fate into the hands of modernity. We thought scientific advances would just improve human conditions. But we produced harmful non-biodegradable materials, aerosols and non-organic fertilizers, among others. We unscrupulously invaded forest ecosystems under the guise of industrialization and development. Simply, our activities to destroy the environment surpass our initiatives to preserve it.
As a response to this concern, we reviewed various paradigms on environment. At one level, we became environmentalists. We accepted our roles as guardians who must work hard to protect the natural environment before time runs out. We basically revived the ancient belief: Nature is a Gift.�E At another phase, we were adherents to James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis -- the planet is alive, functioning as one organism.
Global conventions encouraged localized environmental movements. We came to terms with biodiversity preservation, sustainable development, and halting ozone-depletion and climate-change. Local level family planning, recycling of materials, and the formulation of laws and protocols to protect air and water quality also abound. However, all these efforts never became a shared responsibility of all. We limited our activities within national boundaries. We reduced our task merely as a self-preserving nation -- To each his own.�E We never allowed the international community the chance to play its role as the ultimate steward of environment. We failed to accept the norm that we should be ONE -- beyond national boundaries of land and seas. Did we ever question why the Rio De Janeiro Summit of 1992 never reached a consensus or a determined plan of actions? Why has there been no global convention that offered any solution to the seasonal haze in Indonesia? It is indeed sad to realize that while we have the concerted force to endanger our environment, we never had one stand to respond the crucial issues of saving our great planet!
This is thus the truth to keep in mind. We share the same heaven. We breathe the same air. Our seas form one vast ocean. And we only have one earth to cherish. All these remind us that an international cooperative and borderless effort is the key to save the environment. Otherwise, before we knew it, we just ended up losing our Great Planet Earth �Ethe Almighty's Precious Gift for all of us!
Send your comments to alderite@iuj.ac.jp
Towards A Borderless Stewardship of Environment
by
Arnold Pansoy Alderite
Over the course of the 20th century, we had recognized our interdependent relationship with the great planet Earth. Initially, both man and technology did not possess the capability to significantly influence the planetary systems. But as the 21st century dawned, we started to alarmingly affect the earth's atmosphere, the courses of water, the landscapes, and the relationships among organisms in a natural habitat.
Furthermore, we witnessed the incredible developments in technology, the five-fold growth in the world economy, and the increasing human population of six billion. All these influenced us to become eco-optimists. We saw the abundance of our natural resources. Yet, we relied on human ingenuity so much that we considered its depletion to be of no problem. In fact, governments of nations put our fate into the hands of modernity. We thought scientific advances would just improve human conditions. But we produced harmful non-biodegradable materials, aerosols and non-organic fertilizers, among others. We unscrupulously invaded forest ecosystems under the guise of industrialization and development. Simply, our activities to destroy the environment surpass our initiatives to preserve it.
As a response to this concern, we reviewed various paradigms on environment. At one level, we became environmentalists. We accepted our roles as guardians who must work hard to protect the natural environment before time runs out. We basically revived the ancient belief: Nature is a Gift.�E At another phase, we were adherents to James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis -- the planet is alive, functioning as one organism.
Global conventions encouraged localized environmental movements. We came to terms with biodiversity preservation, sustainable development, and halting ozone-depletion and climate-change. Local level family planning, recycling of materials, and the formulation of laws and protocols to protect air and water quality also abound. However, all these efforts never became a shared responsibility of all. We limited our activities within national boundaries. We reduced our task merely as a self-preserving nation -- To each his own.�E We never allowed the international community the chance to play its role as the ultimate steward of environment. We failed to accept the norm that we should be ONE -- beyond national boundaries of land and seas. Did we ever question why the Rio De Janeiro Summit of 1992 never reached a consensus or a determined plan of actions? Why has there been no global convention that offered any solution to the seasonal haze in Indonesia? It is indeed sad to realize that while we have the concerted force to endanger our environment, we never had one stand to respond the crucial issues of saving our great planet!
This is thus the truth to keep in mind. We share the same heaven. We breathe the same air. Our seas form one vast ocean. And we only have one earth to cherish. All these remind us that an international cooperative and borderless effort is the key to save the environment. Otherwise, before we knew it, we just ended up losing our Great Planet Earth �Ethe Almighty's Precious Gift for all of us!
Send your comments to alderite@iuj.ac.jp
posted by Unknown at
7:35 AM
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